(2004). Why Sport's An Introduction to the Philosophy of Sport By Sheryle Bergmann Drewe (Thompson Educational Publishing, Inc., 2003: Toronto) Journal of the Philosophy of Sport: Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 100-102.

The role of animals in the realm of sport is the focus of this special issue which delves into the nuanced intersections of sport, animals, and ethics. For millennia, humans have forged multifacete...

The Ethics of Sport: A Reader; Cycling: Philosophy for Everyone: A Philosophical Tour De Force.

The present study examined the role of father sensitivity and couple coparenting quality in the first 2 years of life in relation to the development of externalizing behavior problems in middle childhood, focusing on the unique role of fathers. In this study, 125 mothers, fathers, and their first-born children were followed from 8 months to age 7 years. Paternal sensitivity was rated when infants were 8 and 24 months old. Fathers were videotaped at home playing, feeding, and changing their 8-month-old (...) infants’ clothes. They also were videotaped in a lab playing with their 24-month-olds and solving a variety of challenging tasks. At 24 months, competitive coparenting was assessed via videotaped triadic family interactions at home in which families participated in a variety of tasks. Teachers rated externalizing behavior problems when the children were age 7. Continuity in paternal sensitivity was documented from 8 to 24 months, and paternal sensitivity at 8 months predicted externalizing behavior in middle childhood through father sensitivity at 24 months. Moreover, paternal sensitivity at 8 months predicted competitive coparenting which, in turn, forecast externalizing behavior problems in middle childhood, even after controlling for maternal sensitivity at 8 and 24 months. These findings highlight the unique role of paternal caregiving quality during the first year of life on couple coparenting and children’s subsequent development of externalizing problems and have implications for creating effective interventions to prevent children from developing externalizing disorders. (shrink)

Physical and mental training are associated with positive effects on executive functions throughout the lifespan. However, evidence of the benefits of combined physical and mental regimes over a sedentary lifestyle remain sparse. The goal of this study was to investigate potential mechanisms, from a source-resolved event-related-potential perspective, that could explain how practicing long-term physical and mental exercise can benefit neural processing during the execution of an attention switching task. Fifty-three healthy community volunteers who self-reported long-term practice of Tai Chi, meditation (...) + exercise, simple aerobics, or a sedentary lifestyle, aged 47.8 ± 14.6 were included in this analysis. All participants undertook high-density electroencephalography recording during a switch paradigm. Our results indicate that people who practice physical and mental exercise perform better in a task-switching paradigm. Our analysis revealed an additive effect of the combined practice of physical and mental exercise over physical exercise only. In addition, we confirmed the participation of frontal, parietal and cingulate areas as generators of event-related-potential components commonly associated to the performance of switch tasks. Particularly, the N2-like component of the parietal and frontal domains showed significantly greater amplitudes in the exercise and mental training groups compared with aerobics and sedentary groups. Furthermore, we showed better performance associated with greater N2-like amplitudes. Our multivariate analysis revealed that activity type was the most relevant factor to explain the difference between groups, with an important influence of age, and body mass index, and with small effects of educational years, cardiovascular capacity, and sex. These results suggest that chronic combined physical and mental training may confer significant benefits to executive function in normally aging adults, probably through more efficient early attentional processing. Future experimental studies are needed to confirm our results and understand the mechanisms on parieto-frontal networks that contribute to the cognitive improvement associated with practicing combined mental and aerobic exercise, while carefully controlling confounding factors, such as age and body mass index. (shrink)

Patentowanie ludzkich genów jest zjawiskiem, które w obecnych czasach nabrało intensywności i znaczenia. Jest jedną z kluczowych form zabezpieczania praw własności przemysłowej, zwłaszcza dla ośrodków badawczych i koncernów farmaceutycznych. Ze względu na naturę produktu podlegającego opatentowaniu, pomysł patentowania genów budzi wiele kontrowersji i rodzi spory na różnych płaszczyznach. Celem artykułu jest naszkicowanie ram prawnych dla tego zjawiska (m.in. porównanie regulacji europejskich i amerykańskich) oraz krytyczne omówienie argumentów przemawiających zarówno w obronie tej procedury, jak i przeciwko niej, wysuwane z różnych perspektyw: (...) prawnej (kwestia posiadania przez geny tzw. zdolności patentowej, kontrowersje związane z prawem własności do ludzkiego ciała), społeczno-ekonomicznej (wpływ zjawiska na rozwój badań naukowych oraz na ceny leków i dostępność różnych terapii) oraz etycznej (omówionej na podstawie wybranych kazusów). Artykuł zarysowuje również kilka propozycji rozwiązań praktycznych, które mają usuwać przynajmniej niektóre kontrowersje związane z patentowaniem genów. (shrink)

Worldwide interest in understanding art and creative practices as valid forms of knowledge production has led to the establishment of research-creation as an interdisciplinary academic field in the last twenty years in Canada as elsewhere. Its establishment relates to a growing interest in critical making and technological innovation and to the legacies of feminism(s) and its critique of the power dynamics of knowledge production within academia. This article outlines a series of interactive projects that bring visibility to Latin American women (...) in art, science and technology and speculates on the legacies of feminism(s) in the emergence of research-creation. The four projects discussed build on each other and explore re-mediation, re-activation and re-enactment as part of a collaborative feminist research-creation methodology. I theorize their potential to activate political memory by highlighting how these three approaches to creation share a preoccupation for revisiting the past through repetition, iteration and the facilitation of intergenerational encounters among humans, non-humans and across media and technologies. While discussing the feminist orientation of these approaches, I suggest a critique of dominant modes of knowledge production that have obscured the contributions of Latin American women and offer four research-creation interventions in the media arts archive. (shrink)

In this article the relations between philosophy and applied ethics are considered. The presented deliberation is concentrated on the question whether philosophy has contributed to applied ethics, especially to business ethics. Trying to find an answer to this question I will refer to the discussion which was started by R. Rorty in which he presented his own point of view on the issues related to moral development and the role of philosophy and philosophers in the modern world. Rorty points at (...) proper tools which, in his opinion, can be helpful to business ethicists and formulates the goal they should try to aim at. His opinions has started a vivid discussion. Patricia H. Werhane, Daryl Koehn and Richard T. De George try to discuss with Rorty’s statement. They oppose Rorty’s argument that philosophy is not more relevant to applied ethics than any other academic disciplines. They point to the facts which document philosophers’ contribution in forming business ethics. This article presents their arguments as well as an attempt of their critical assessment. (shrink)

This work is the first monograph devoted to the interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of chance in Physics II 4-6 and its implications and projections in other treatises, including an original and comprehensive account of the Aristotelian conception of chance, of accidental causality in the realm of nature, and of accidental causality in the realm of human action. One of the main interpretative issues around Aristotle’s discussion of chance is its relation to the four causes and to teleology. In this sense, (...) it is particularly difficult to find the common features which fortune (tyche) and spontaneity (automaton) share. This work, offers such an interpretation of Aristotle’s general concept of chance (i.e. common to fortune and spontaneity), which shows clearly its relation with his theory of causality (Phys. II 3), with teleology, and with the application of this theory to the study of nature. It also shows how fortune and spontaneity can be interpreted consistently with this general characterization of chance, and how the specific differences between them can be accounted for paying attention to the different structures of causality in the realm of nature and in the realm of human action. Regarding the specific concept of spontaneity (automaton), a crux interpretum, the book offers one of the few independent discussions this issue in Aristotelian literature, and proposes a sub-classification in two kinds of spontaneity based on an analysis of Aristotle’s different examples and characterizations: ‘mixed spontaneity’ (which shares some features with fortune), and ‘pure spontaneity’ (which takes place strictly in the realm of nature). These different structures had not been recognized in specialized literature before. The problem of chance has projections into Aristotle’s natural philosophy, as well as into Aristotle’s theory of action and practical philosophy. This ample perspective of Aristotle’s work, and of the different explanatory models and ontological structures therein involved, constitutes an interesting groundwork for future developments in some or many of these realms of investigation. (shrink)

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then (...) a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object. (shrink)

When constructed in linear terms, cultures and identities misrepresent other people, constructing crisp boundaries that separate groups as if completely different. To demonstrate the negative impact of such views, I analyze cultural texts such as songs, films, and Web pages, showing the intercultural complexity existing in different constructions of Mexicanness as part of the dialogue arising in the political, social, and cultural interaction between Mexico and the United States. I emphasize the contrast between examples that reinforce identities that can be (...) interpreted as fuzzy and inclusive, against those promoting and generating discrimination and exclusion. (shrink)

The practice of theoretical research in chemistry largely consists in the construction of models without which experimentation would be impossible. The best-known theoretical models in chemistry are those of the molecular structures of chemical compounds. What is the correspondence between these models and the unobservable entities that they are meant to explain? What is the ontological status of molecular models? The anti-realists question the basis of the realists’ belief in these entities and the truth claims regarding them. Ultimately, the realist/anti-realist (...) debate points to the question of the scope of scientific knowledge. In this paper, I shall show that the description of natural entities offered by the contemporary scientific worldview reveals that molecular modeling presupposes a realistic epistemology that recognizes the limits of scientific objectification. (shrink)

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lysis) of an argument. These two terms are (...) employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

In this paper I re-examine the status of the mind-body relation in several of Plato’s late dialogues. A range of views has been attributed to Plato here. For example, it has been thought that Plato is a substance dualist, for whom the mind can exist independently of the body; or an attribute dualist, who has left behind the strong dualistic commitments of the Phaedo by allowing that the mind may be the subject of spatial movements. But even in cases where (...) a classification of Plato as a holder of a particular ontology of the mind has been left undefined, it has been a shared assumption that in the late dialogues the mind itself must be immaterial. I take issue with these various views and show that none of them is necessitated by the text. In the first place, I argue there is strong evidence against the view that Plato should, in his late period, be committed not only to substance dualism, but also to attribute dualism. Furthermore, it is possible that Plato may have allowed that the mind itself be a three-dimensional corporeal entity (in a way that sets up a precedent for later Stoic developments). But even if this is not the only possible reading of the text, it is shown how at any rate the mind must be seen in late Plato as the principle of organization of a body and ontologically inseparable from it. Despite prima facie affinities with Aristotle here, we shall see a Plato emerge for whom the mind (without exception) and the body cannot exist without one another – a thesis more radical than that of Aristotle’s. To bring out the provocative nature of this suggestion, I start, in section I, by laying out the state of the question and compare what I shall argue is the late Platonic view with standard interpretations of his previous work, stressing the historical force that I expect this thesis to have. Afterwards, in three respective sections, I proceed to pay heed to relevant passages in the Timaeus, Philebus and Laws in order to establish the main point of this paper. Finally, in section V, I consider the challenge apparently introduced against my thesis by Plato’s occasional talk of immortality and eschatology in those dialogues, and argue instead that many of those passages add further strength to the view defended in this essay. (shrink)

This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the "Philebus." According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the "Philebus" to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin (...) have seen the "Philebus'" arguments against false pleasures as an actual attack on hedonism, showing -- in Irwin's words -- "why maximization of pleasure cannot be a reasonable policy for the best life." Against these claims, I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the "Philebus" as a first best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate -- rather than reject -- pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. Thus, I offer alternative readings of controversial passages that have given rise to the prevalent interpretation criticized here, and advance positive evidence that at least some pleasures are seen by Plato as inherently good. In addition, I demonstrate that Plato's arguments against false pleasures do not by themselves constitute an attack on hedonism. Rather, they can be seen as a strategy to show the hedonist that, in order to be a maximal, or even a consistent, hedonist, he should go for true, and not fake pleasures, if after all pleasure is the object of his pursuit. But, since this cannot be achieved without intelligence, then the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is to be accepted even by hedonist themselves. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the role of some peculiar elements of Aristotle's dialectical development —namely, those emerging in the Sophistical Refutations (SE)— in the analysis and discussion of the Eleatic thesis in Physics I, 2-3. The paper adresses some of Aristotle's preliminary thoughts (Phys. I, 2) (which are read as methodological considerations), and some remarks against Melissus' argument (Phys. I, 3), in order to find connections between such claims and passages of SE, as well as the (...) Topics. -/- . (shrink)

In the present study the impact of need for cognitive closure manipulations via time pressure and explicit closure goal activation on executive control was investigated. Although there is some evidence that NFC, measured as an individual variable, is related to better performing in attentional tasks involving executive control, these results have never been validated across different manipulations of NFC. Thus, in the present study we induced NFC via internal and external time pressure and tested the impact of these manipulations on (...) the performance in tasks that measure executive control, i.e., the Stroop and switching tasks. The results revealed that induced high NFC, indeed boosted performance in executive control tasks. Moreover, there was no difference in the effect of both NFC manipulations on task performance. The implications regarding the role of executive control and specific NFC manipulations in social cognition are discussed. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene como objetivo identificar en el libro de la temprana Hannah Arendt sobre la vida de Rahel Varnhagen —Rahel Varnhagen: The life of a Jewess— los primeros esbozos de los conceptos políticos que desarrollaría a lo largo de su vida dedicada a la teoría política, haciendo un seguimiento de su posterior aparición en diferentes obras. Se enfatiza el análisis aplicado de los conceptos de asimilación, paria y advenedizo. Se compara además las personas de Hannah Arendt y Rahel Varnhagen (...) en cuanto a su origen judío y su condición de mujeres, tanto en la vida pública como en la privada y en la profundidad de su respectiva intimidad. (shrink)

Starting from the question of Émile Bernard to Cézanne: “nature and art are not different?”, and the painter’s answer: “ I would like to join them”, we thought that it would be possible to link the spirit of this sentence with the advances of the art in the 21st century. Cézanne’s attitude designs the union between the two realities: art and nature. This union, in the 21st century, has a new artistic representation called bio-art. With bio-art the dichotomy between art (...) and nature disappears and the artistic-scientific product, as a phenomenological object, is a new substance and opens a new ontology. (shrink)

In this paper I address some aspects of the discussion of Aristotle against materialism. I take as a starting point the inaugural sentence of Phys. 2.4, where Aristotle refers to the endoxon that there are things which are (einai), and things which become or are generated (gignesthai) by chance. In the first place, I show that Aristotle would have ascribed to the materialists (especially Empedocles) the opinion that things like animals and plants can be (and not only become) by chance. (...) I shall argue that, in fact, this thesis implies that it is not only the compound that is generated, but also the form or eidos of the living being. To this extent, I propose that there are strong reasons for Aristotle to reject that living beings may be by chance, and to circumscribe chance to that which becomes or is generated. In other words: chance can occur within processes of generation but has nothing to do with the causes and principles of those processes. Thus, this repositioning of chance within the sole field of what becomes is closely connected to the causal priority of the eidos in the processes of generation. (shrink)

Environmental anxiety is often thought of as a psychopathological condition. Our paper aims to challenge this narrow understanding by offering an existential-phenomenological interpretation of environmental anxiety that posits it as an _existential attunement_ with a transformative potential, capable of opening the anxious individual to a hopeful and meaningful outlook on the future. In the first part of the paper, we provide a conceptual analysis of environmental anxiety, drawing on current interdisciplinary taxonomies of environmental emotions as well as on existential-phenomenological definitions (...) of anxiety. We then proceed to define the two key existential characteristics of environmental anxiety, firstly (i) its ability to reframe the aesthetic perception of nature, and secondly (ii) its impact on the subjective constitution of meaning. In the second part of the paper, drawing on the work of Kierkegaard and contemporary ecopsychological and ecotheological thinkers, a distinction is made between a naïve and a radical form of environmental hope. It is argued that while the former type of hope leads to inactivity, the latter is capable of motivating individuals to pro-environmental action. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a (...) scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change (substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities. These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no coming-to-be (...) ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to refute several charges that have recently been raised against Plato’s attitude toward the environment and to present him under a new light of relevance for the contemporary environmental debate. For this purpose, I assess the meaning of Plato’s metaphysical dualism, his notion of nature and teleology, and the kind of value that he attributes to animals, plants, and the land in general. I thus show how Plato’s organicist view of the universe endows it (...) with an intrinsic value that is over and above each of its parts, including humans, and provides an argument for the preservation of species of nonhuman animals, which in many relevant ways are not ranked below the human species. In addition, I show how Plato’s dialogues provide good evidence for human concern about the environment and how such a concern is promoted rather than hindered by his nonanthropocentric notion of teleology. (shrink)

This paper will focus on what is perhaps the most characteristic doctrine of Numenius: that which taking into account what is said in the Second Letter attributed to Plato, affirms the existence of three gods. By analyzing some preserved fragments, I try to offer an overview of numenian theology to thereby specify the particularity of Numenius’ thought in the context of Platonism of his time, fact that makes him one of the most relevant predecessors of Plotinus’s system.

This paper explores what the three best-known thinkers in the sentimentalist tradition - David Hume (1711-76), Adam Smith (1723-90), and Edmund Burke (1729-97) – have to say about the topic of “dirty hands” (the view that some forms of power, used properly, lead to guilt and bad actions). Although the views of these philosophers have often been declared inconsistent, my project is to defend and resurrect key elements of their position, which may have value for this debate. I contend that (...) a coherent and unified view about dirty hands may be extracted from their work. By discussing this view, I aim to elucidate a philosophical tradition that may not be familiar to many readers today.On their sentimentalist approach, all jobs or social roles inevitably lead to characteristic varieties of wrongdoing (i.e. dirty hands), due to corruption, increased temptation and opportunity. Such inevitability does not excuse the wrongdoing, but it might diminish the appropriate level of moral blame for those at the bottom, while enhancing blame for persons at the top. (shrink)

This paper deals with Plato’s theoretical views on rhetoric, its value, its conditions, and its genuine ethical-political function. My goal is to show that, even from the theoretical and/or metarhetorical point of view (Gorgias and Phaedrus), Plato would admit the practice of arguing from probabilities (eikós) and opinions, and would accept as a legitimate part of rhetoric –in order to persuade the mob– devices such as appeals to emotion. As it is well known, concrete uses of these devices can be (...) found in the dialogues. I will refer, in this vein, to some passages of Plato’s political writings, esp. Republic and Laws, and to the role of some myths in the dialogues. Nonetheless, I sustain the necessity (and the possibility) of harmonizing this view, with Plato’s strong claim that knowledge of (and commitment to) an objective truth is essential to the true rhétor. (shrink)

The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I will argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion which is (...) currently somewhat extended among interpreters. (shrink)

This article is about the methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics 7.1, 1145b2–7, and the way they are carried out in the following chapters. I argue that the procedure therein described does not aim to establish consistency among a subset of endoxa, but to test and refine—by considering and resolving objections against them—endoxa that could enter into a nominal definition of continence and incontinence. The dialectical lineage of this discussion, if there is one, is to be found in the use of (...) the critical procedure of resolution that can be traced back to Topics and Sophistical Refutations. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance (and of accidental causes), meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to (...) chance, is best understood as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)

This article offers an interpretation of Aristotle’s tenet that chance and accidental causes are indeterminate. According to one existing reading, the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the effect of chance, meaning ‘causally indeterminate.’ Another reading claims instead that the predicate ‘indeterminate’ is said of the cause of a chance event, meaning something close to ‘potentially infinite in number.’ For my part, I contend that the predicate ‘indeterminate,’ when applied to Aristotle’s concept of accidental cause and to chance, is best understood (...) as a second-order predicate. More precisely, Aristotle uses ‘indeterminate’ to qualify a certain type of causal relation, rather than to indicate a quality of the causal power or of the effect. As a preparatory step in my argument, I contend that ‘accidental’ and ‘per se’ are also best understood as second-order predicates of ‘cause,’ and as a corollary of my main thesis I offer an interpretation of how chance involves an infinite number of possible causes. (shrink)

RESUMEN Recientes intentos por conectar la ética y la biología aristotélicas marcan una suerte de continuidad entre el carácter de los animales no racionales y de los seres humanos, de modo tal que en la descripción de los caracteres de los animales no racionales puede identificarse el punto de partida biológico del propio ser humano en el desarrollo de su carácter moral. En este artículo, propongo señalar los límites de este tipo de lectura, ya que, entendida de cierto modo, ella (...) implica una continuidad entre la normatividad natural y la normatividadpráctica propia de un naturalismo fundacionalista que no puede atribuirse a Aristóteles. En conexión con ello, sostengo que el concepto de virtud natural no es un concepto natural, sino ético, tal que sólo cobra sentido en el marco de la normatividad práctica; la virtud natural, en este sentido, no forma parte de una explicación genética de la virtud sino de un análisis que va del todo a las partes, de acuerdo al cual ella no es anterior sino posterior a la virtud ética. ABSTRACT A recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship tries to link ethics and biology. Within these attempts, some sort of continuity between the character of non-rational animals and that of human beings has been proposed, so that the starting point ofmoral development could be identified in Aristotle’s description of animal’s character. In this article I argue that this reading should strongly qualified, for understood in some ways it entails a sort of continuity between natural normativity and practical normativity that belongs to an Archimedean ethical naturalism, which cannot be reconstructed from Aristotle’s writings. Connected to this, I argue that the concept of natural virtue is not a natural concept, but an ethical one that only makes sense from within the realm of practical normativity; natural virtue, thus understood, is not part of a genetic explanation of virtue, but emerges from a conceptual whole-part analysis. In this manner, natural virtue is no prior, but posterior to ethical virtue. (shrink)

Resumen: En Metafísica E 2 y 3 Aristóteles discute el problema de lo que es por accidente y sus causas, con el fin último de examinar si esto puede ser objeto de la filosofía primera. El resultado de esta discusión es, en este sentido, negativo. Sin embargo, la filosofía primera tiene algo que decir acerca del accidente, aunque solo sea mediante un discurso de segundo orden. La naturaleza de lo accidental es así explorada en estas páginas de la Metafísica para (...) confirmar la imposibilidad de un estudio científico acerca de esta forma de ser y sus causas. La parte central de este artículo discute el complejo pasaje E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, donde Aristóteles presenta las causas de lo que es por accidente. Procuraré mostrar que las tres causas allí presentadas son no solo compatibles, sino también relevantes para la completa caracterización de lo accidental, en la medida en que pueden entenderse como la causa formal, eficiente y material de lo que es por accidente.: Aristotle’s Metaphysics E 2 and 3 are devoted to the discussion about accidental being and its causes, with the aim of assessing its credentials as a possible object of first philosophy. The result of this discussion is, in this sense, negative. However, first philosophy has something to say about accidental being, if only through a second order speech. The nature of the accidental is thus explored in these pages of Metaphysics, with the ultimate aim of confirming the impossibility of a scientific study about this way of being and its causes. The central part of this paper deals with E 2, 1026b27-1027a15, where Aristotle introduces the causes of accidental being. I endeavor to show that each of the three causes presented in these lines are compatible and relevant, as they can be understood, respectively, as the formal, efficient and material cause of what happens by accident. (shrink)

The article analyzes the relation between practical normativity and nature focusing on the classical locus NE II 1, 1103a18-26, where Aristotle expressly considers the relation of nature to excellence of character. I argue that in Aristotle neither is practical normativity necessarily grounded on any kind of natural normativity, nor is nature is to be conceived of as being for the sake of human ends. The article deals, to a large extent, precisely with the limits and intersections between these two kinds (...) of normativity in Aristotle. I claim that, in the Aristotelian texts, human nature does not provide any more positive ethical goals than that of developing and making use of our reason and of our capacity to tell right from wrong. But, at the same time, human nature seems to set the conditions of possibility for practical normativity, through the special causality exerted by human beings as agents, i.e. due to the fact that, as rational beings, we do some things not “by nature” but eph’ hemin. (shrink)

En este trabajo se presenta una comparación de los tiempos de respuesta, optimización de la ruta y complejidad del grafo en métodos de planificación de trayectoria para robots móviles autónomos. Se contrastan los desarrollos de Voronoi, Campos potenciales, Roadmap probabilístico y Descomposición en celdas para la navegación en un mismo entorno y validándolos para un número variable de obstáculos. Las evaluaciones demuestran que el método de generación de trayectoria por Campos Potenciales, mejora la navegación respecto de la menor ruta obtenida, (...) el método Rapidly Random Tree genera los grafos de menor complejidad y el método Descomposición en celdas, se desempeña con menor tiempo de respuesta y menor coste computacional. Palabras Clave: optimización, trayectoria, métodos de planificación, robots móviles. Referencias [1]H. Ajeil, K. Ibraheem, A. Sahib y J. Humaidi, “Multi-objective path planning of an autonomous mobile robot using hybrid PSO-MFB optimization algorithm, ” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 89, April 2020. [2]K.Patle, G. Babu, A. Pandey, D.R.K. Parhi y A. Jagadeesh, “A review: On path planning strategies for navigation of mobile robot,” Defence Technology, vol. 15, pp. 582-606, August 2019. [3]T. Mack, C. Copot, D. Trung y R. De Keyser, “Heuristic approaches in robot path planning: A survey,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 86, pp. 13-28, December 2016. [4]L. Zhang, Z. Lin, J. Wang y B. He, “Rapidly-exploring Random Trees multi-robot map exploration under optimization framework,” Robotics and Autonomous Systems, vol. 131, 2020. [5]S. Khan y M. K. Ahmmed, "Where am I? Autonomous navigation system of a mobile robot in an unknown environment," 2016 5th International Conference on Informatics, Electronics and Vision, pp. 56-61, December 2016. [6]V. Castro, J. P. Neira, C. L. Rueda, J. C. Villamizar y L. Angel, "Autonomous Navigation Strategies for Mobile Robots using a Probabilistic Neural Network," IECON 2007 - 33rd Annual Conference of the IEEE Industrial Electronics Society, pp. 2795-2800, Taipei, 2007. [7]Y. Li, W. Wei, Y. Gao, D. Wang y C. Fan, “PQ-RRT*: An improved path planning algorithm for mobile robots,” Expert Systems with Applications, vol. 152, August 2020. [8]A. Muñoz, “Generación global de trayectorias para robots móviles, basada en curvas betaspline,” Dep. Ingeniería de Sistemas y Automática Escuela Técnica Superior de Ingeniería Universidad de Sevilla, 2014. [9]H. Montiel, E. Jacinto y H. Martínez, “Generación de Ruta Óptima para Robots Móviles a Partir de Segmentación de Imágenes,” Información Tecnológica, vol. 26, 2015. [10] C. Expósito, “Los diagramas de Vornooi, la forma matemática de dividir el mundo,” Dialnet, Diciembre 2016. (shrink)

This paper tries to perform a reading of emmanuel levinas through its ethics and, in particular, his conception of the Messianic. To do so, delving two different ways on the ‘face’ notion: on the one hand, its phenomenological heritage, on the other hand, their Jewish roots. Towards the end of the work we support that levinasian Messianism has the character of impolitic, i.e., of a thought that attempts to transcend the threshold of political towards a critical considerations.

RESUMENEl siguiente artículo intenta pensar un modo de articulación de la relación aporética entre la justicia y el derecho presentadas por la filosofía derridiana de los últimos años, bajo la exigencia de pensar una justicia que posea el carácter de la incondicionalidad, una justicia irreductible al derecho. A nuestro juicio, el énfasis del filósofo franco-argelino por establecer tal distinción concluye en un hiato problemático, en la medida en que dicho concepto quedaría relegado al estatuto de la trascendencia, cuando no al (...) de una idea regulativa en el sentido kantiano del término. Para evitar este hiato, propondremos un posible vínculo entre el derecho y la justicia entendido como una forma de contacto entre lo posible y lo imposible. Para ello, nos valdremos de la categoría de espectro y de la modalidad de existencia que esta figura presenta, a saber, la del asedio.PALABRAS CLAVEJUSTICIA, DERECHO, ESPECTRO, ASEDIOABSTRACTThe following article attempts to find a way of articulating the aporethic relationship between justice and law presented by Derridean philosophy in the last years, where justice must be regarded as bearing the character of unconditionality and being therefore irreducible to law. To our minds, the French-Algerian philosopher’s emphasis on substantiating such distinction reaches a problematic hiatus, insofar as such concept of justice would be relegated to the statute of transcendence, if not to the extent of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense of the term. In order to avoid this hiatus, we propose a possible link between law and justice being it understood as a form of contact between the possible and the impossible, and we use both the category of spectre and its modality of existence, i.e., haunt.KEY WORDSJUSTICE, LAW, SPECTRE, HAUNT. (shrink)

RESUMENEl siguiente artículo intenta pensar un modo de articulación de la relación aporética entre la justicia y el derecho presentadas por la filosofía derridiana de los últimos años, bajo la exigencia de pensar una justicia que posea el carácter de la incondicionalidad, una justicia irreductible al derecho. A nuestro juicio, el énfasis del filósofo franco-argelino por establecer tal distinción concluye en un hiato problemático, en la medida en que dicho concepto quedaría relegado al estatuto de la trascendencia, cuando no al (...) de una idea regulativa en el sentido kantiano del término. Para evitar este hiato, propondremos un posible vínculo entre el derecho y la justicia entendido como una forma de contacto entre lo posible y lo imposible. Para ello, nos valdremos de la categoría de espectro y de la modalidad de existencia que esta figura presenta, a saber, la del asedio.PALABRAS CLAVEJUSTICIA, DERECHO, ESPECTRO, ASEDIOABSTRACTThe following article attempts to find a way of articulating the aporethic relationship between justice and law presented by Derridean philosophy in the last years, where justice must be regarded as bearing the character of unconditionality and being therefore irreducible to law. To our minds, the French-Algerian philosopher’s emphasis on substantiating such distinction reaches a problematic hiatus, insofar as such concept of justice would be relegated to the statute of transcendence, if not to the extent of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense of the term. In order to avoid this hiatus, we propose a possible link between law and justice being it understood as a form of contact between the possible and the impossible, and we use both the category of spectre and its modality of existence, i.e., haunt.KEY WORDSJUSTICE, LAW, SPECTRE, HAUNT. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Kant's third antinomy introduces freedom as the unconditioned cause that allows reason to form a synthesis of causal linkage. What different thinking conditions, I ask, does this antinomy open up for reason even to entertain any possibility of success? Reason's ability to form a synthesis depends on acknowledging the role in Kant's argument of a subject that does not need to be envisioned as a standpoint—whether intelligible or empirical, as Kant's explicit solution has it—but, rather, as the site of (...) a relationship between the series and its outside. We may call it “unconditioned subjectivity,” clarifying from the outset that subjectivity in this sense names a structural position that plays an exceptional role in the series: it is the element that exceptionally introduces a boundary, a fleeting moment of closure. Unconditioned subjectivity would name the relationship and boundary that anchor the phenomenal series time and again. I argue, moreover, that the synthesis of causality forming here coheres as a dynamic system that is not stable or self-contained but, rather, contingent and “in progress.” Perhaps unexpectedly, the potential of this antinomy to form this dynamic system hinges on the fact that its antithesis denies freedom. (shrink)